Inside NDS
The following paper -- Inside NDS -- explains the Pandora research project
and what has been discovered so far. It was originally released on June 27,
1997 and was revised on March 10, 1998. In May of 1999 it was revised with
information related to Netware 5. But Pandora really started in early 1997.
At that time L0pht Heavy Industries [www.l0pht.com] released the first
version of L0phtCrack, a program designed to take advantage of Windows NT's
dependency on legacy systems and crack passwords. After Novell tried to rake
Microsoft over the coals by stating that not even administrators could access
password hashes, let alone recover the actual passwords from Netware, Pandora
was born.
Abstract
This document will present a technical view of the layout of Novell's Netware
Directory Services (NDS). The emphasis here is mainly from a security
perspective, and tries to point out several areas of weakness that need to be
reinforced. Novell had originally touted the advanced security features built
into NDS as being superior to other network operating systems, including
statements that passwords cannot be recovered, even by administrators.
Obviously since the release of Pandora Novell has had to rethink this. In
this document, our third revisit to NDS, we will examine how to recover the
passwords, and give a complete layout of NDS, including the new Netware 5
released in September 1998.
Audience
While I am probably more well known for the Netware Hack FAQ and presentation
of security issues related to Netware from an intruder perspective, this
document is geared more toward those simply interested in how things work.
But due to the fact that I am covering security issues, the inference is
still there.
I do assume some basic Netware knowledge, and I make use of some examples of
C code to explain some concepts, therefore knowledge of C coding might be of
some help. I have tried to make this as non-technical as possible, but due to
the material being covered, unless you are a bit head this is probably going
to be a very dry read.
Credits
If you read nothing, or just a paragraph or two, please at least read these
credits. I did have some support during this project, and I want to
acknowledge a few people. For some background help and some code snippets,
itsme [itsme@xs4all.nl] provided a lot. On version 1.0 I bounced ideas off of
Greg Miller [greg.miller@usa.net], Al Grant [ag129@cam.ac.uk], and Rx2
[rx2@usa.net]. Thanks a lot. And with version 2.0 I received a number of
comments regarding the code, including example source code. While I
incorporated a number of features suggested by Thomas Lackner
[alackn01@fiu.edu], it was the changes submitted by Jitsu-Disk
[jitsu@nmrc.org] that drastically changed things. The speed increase is
absolutely astounding. On a Pentium 100 Mhz the speed increase was 76 times
faster. That's not a typo, 76 times faster, not 76% faster. His paper
explaining how he rewrote the itsme-supplied proof-of-concept code has been
included in Pandora since version 2.0.
Lab assistance was provided by Mr. Wizard [otter@fastlane.net] and Fourth
Stooge [stooge@onramp.net]. Mr. Wizard provided several examples of BACKUP.DS
so I had multiple copies to play with, and Fourth Stooge provided hardware in
the form of hard drives for the lab. Without the drive space I would have
been very limited, and without the extra BACKUP.DS files I would not have
been able to accurately cross check the different 4.x Netware versions for
consistancy.
Finally I would like to thank two more people, my wife [grace@nmrc.org] for
naming the project Pandora after hearing my explanation of what the hell I
was doing in the lab for hours at a time, and Marcus Williamson
[71333.1665@compuserve.com] for trying to keep me honest through a series of
email exchanges where he constantly tried to get me to admit that this was
NOT a security breach (that is left for you, the humble reader, to decide).
Tools
There were a number of tools used in the preparation of this document. The
two main tools were a hex dump utility and a hex calculator. By examining the
NDS files in the hex dump utility and playing with some of the values, a
picture of how the files were tied together emerged. I also used a C compiler
and wrote several utilities to extract and examine the data. Most of the
utilities were short programs of little use to the general public, but as I
continued to explore I wrote more useful utilities for NDS extraction. These
utilities, along with a copy of this document were released as a set called
Pandora. Pandora is available from http://www.nmrc.org/files/netware/, or
from a link on the Pandora Home Page at http://www.nmrc.org/pandora.
Background
NDS is a distributed database for Netware 4.x and 5.x that provides access to
all network resources. It allows a user to use a single login to a Netware
environment and approach a group of Netware servers as a single entity. GUI
interfaces provide easy management for administrators.
NDS itself consists of 4 core files. On Netware 4.x, these files include
PARTITIO.NDS, ENTRY.NDS, VALUE.NDS, and BLOCK.NDS. On Netware 5.x, the files
are named slightly differently. The file names have an extension of DSD
instead of NDS, and a new file with an extension of DSB is present. Here is a
chart to explain the difference between the files.
Netware 4.x File Netware 5.x Equivalent File
---------------- ---------------------------
ENTRY.NDS 0.DSD
VALUE.NDS 1.DSD
BLOCK.NDS 2.DSD
PARTITIO.NDS 3.DSD
We will cover the DSB file, usually named 0.DSB, a little later. But I will
state that the 0.DSB file is to keep track of which DSD file serves what
function. However, in this paper when I refer to ENTRY.NDS I am also
referring to 0.DSD unless I specify otherwise. So you may want to keeping
referring to the chart above.
The files are stored on the SYS: volume in a hidden directory called
_NETWARE. This directory cannot be directly accessed from a user login
session, including an administrator.
All objects addressed by the server are located within the ENTRY.NDS file.
All named attributes have a record, and all administrator-created items have
a record. For example, there is a record called USER which contains
information about the USER property itself, and a record for a user called
Admin which contains information about that particular USER object.
Values associated with ENTRY records are stored in one and sometimes two
files. VALUE.NDS will contain up to 16 bytes of data about an ENTRY record.
Why so little? Well, 16 bytes is EXACTLY what is needed for one ACL entry.
ACL entries are the most common VALUE records. If more than 16 bytes of
information is needed, the VALUE record has a pointer to BLOCK.NDS. This
file's records can contain up to 108 bytes of data. If still more room is
needed, extra BLOCK records can be linked together via pointers.
The partition information is contained within PARTITIO.NDS, which is
basically used to keep track of a minimal amount of information that helps
NDS replicate and sync up the data between servers.
Accessing NDS
First off, to explore NDS one must retrieve a copy from a server. This is
actually easier than it seems. The two main ways to get copies of NDS involve
console access, and could interrupt server access during retrieval. If you
are pulling a copy of NDS off of a server, make sure you wait until a time
when user activity is at a minimal. The interruption will mean that access to
network resources that have not been authenticated will not work.
If users are already logged in, they should not notice any interruptions.
This is similiar to the impact encountered during a DSREPAIR.
The first method involves using either RCONSOLE or direct console access and
loading an NLM that allows access to SYS:_NETWARE to retrieve the copies. Two
such NLMs are JCMD.NLM and NETBASIC.NLM. JCMD.NLM is freeware available on
the Internet, but NETBASIC.NLM is the prefered method, as this NLM is bundled
with Netware 4.11. Loading NETBASIC and typing "shell" drops you to a pseudo
DOS-like environment. From here you can simply cd into SYS:_NETWARE, and copy
the *.NDS files to another location on the server (for example SYS:LOGIN).
Remember, DS.NLM must be unloaded to do this on larger systems. I have
received reports of small LANs allowing copies to be made while DS.NLM was
loaded. YMMV.
For the faint of heart, there is another method using DSMAINT.NLM or
DSREPAIR.NLM. If you don't have these NLMs, they are available from Novell's
web site. The by-product of running these NLMs is a backup file containing
the local copy of NDS. If you use DSMAINT, a file called BACKUP.DS is
created. If you use DSREPAIR, a file called DSREPAIR.DIB is created.
It should be obvious, but if your server console is compromised, an intruder
could do this as well. And if the file system is compromised, BACKUP.DS and
DSREPAIR.DIB will be tempting targets. Only keep these files around until you
are sure they are no longer needed, and then delete and purge them.
NDS File Structure
The 4 files -- ENTRY.NDS, VALUE.NDS, BLOCK.NDS, and PARTITIO.NDS -- as well
as their 5.x equivalents -- 0.DSD, 1.DSD, 2.DSD, and 3.DSD -- are binary
files that consist of individual records. Here is the structure (as well as I
can determine without the source code) for each record. Included are my
comments:
typedef unsigned long uint32;
typedef unsigned int uint16;
typedef unsigned char uint8;
/*
* struct for ENTRY.NDS records
*/
typedef struct entry
{
uint32 selfOffset; /* Offset in ENTRY.NDS. If this is
the first record, it is 0x00000000
followed by 0x0000014e for the
second record, etc. */
uint32 checkSum; /* I assume a checksum */
uint32 val1; /* Unsure, 0xfeffffff. */
uint32 val2; /* Unsure, 0xffffffff. */
uint32 peer; /* Offset to a peer record. */
uint32 firstChild; /* Offset to first child record. If
no kids, 0xffffffff. */
uint32 lastChild; /* Offset to second child record. If
no kids, 0xffffffff. */
uint32 firstValue; /* Offset in VALUE.NDS of first
attribute. They are usually kept
in order in VALUE.NDS, but since
they are crossed referenced in
VALUE.NDS they don't have to be.*/
uint32 id; /* The Object ID of the record. */
uint32 partitionID; /* The partition ID of the record. */
uint32 parentID; /* The parent's Object ID, if no
parent it is 0xffffffff. */
uint32 val3; /* No idea. Usually a small number.*/
uint32 val4; /* No idea. 0x00000000. */
uint32 subordinates; /* Number of subordinates. This can
include other objects besides
children. */
uint32 classID; /* The "type" of Object ID. */
uint32 creatTime1, /* When object was created. */
creatTime2;
uint32 modTime1, /* When object was last modified. */
modTime2;
uint8 name[258]; /* Dreaded unicode describing
the record. If a user object
it will be the common name. */
} ENTRY; /* size=334 */
/*
* struct for VALUE.NDS records
*/
typedef struct value
{
uint32 selfOffset; /* Offset in VALUE.NDS. If this is
the first record, it is 0x00000000
followed by 0x00000040 for the
second record, etc. */
uint32 checkSum; /* I assume a checksum */
uint32 val1; /* Unsure, usually 0xfeffffff. */
uint32 val2; /* Unsure, usually 0xffffffff. */
uint32 nextVal; /* The next Value record's offset. */
uint32 firstBlock; /* Offset in BLOCK.NDS if used. */
uint32 entryID; /* Type of record in ENTRY.NDS. */
uint32 typeID; /* Type of VALUE record. */
uint32 val3; /* No idea. Usually a small number.*/
uint32 creatTime1, /* When object was created, */
creatTime2; /* and modified. */
uint32 length; /* Length of data. */
uint8 data[16]; /* Start of data, unless there is a
small amount of data, then it's
all here. */
} VALUE; /* size=64 */
/*
* struct for BLOCK.NDS records
*/
typedef struct block
{
uint32 selfOffset; /* Offset in BLOCK.NDS. If this is
the first record, it is 0x00000000
followed by 0x00000080 for the
second record, etc. */
uint32 checkSum; /* I assume a checksum */
uint32 val1; /* Unsure. */
uint32 nextBlock; /* Next record if data>120. */
uint32 valueOffset; /* Offset in VALUE.NDS (backlink) */
uint8 data[108];
} BLOCK; /* size=128 */
/*
* struct for PARTITIO.NDS records
*/
typedef struct partition
{
uint32 selfOffset; /* Offset in PARTITIO.NDS. If this is
the first record, it is 0x00000000
followed by 0x00000028 for the
second record, etc. */
uint32 checkSum; /* I assume a checksum */
uint32 val1; /* Unsure. */
uint32 id; /* ID of record. */
uint32 entryID; /* ID in ENTRY.NDS */
uint32 replicaID; /* Replica ID (??) in ENTRY.NDS */
uint32 val2; /* Unsure. */
uint32 val3; /* Unsure. */
uint32 timeStamp1, /* Probably used to keep things in sync */
timeStamp2;
} PARTITIO; /* size=40 */
As you can see I've had to guess at a lot of these, but I think there is
enough there to allow you to see what is in NDS. As far as the DSD files with
Netware 5.x goes, the basic structure appears to be the same. However, in
preparation for porting of NDS to non-Intel systems, Novell has begun to
"universally" read and write data to the drive, eliminating the big
endian/little endian problem.
BACKUP.DS and Structure
If you retrieve BACKUP.DS, you need to reconstruct the NDS files into their
original 4 components. The structure of BACKUP.DS is as follows -
|---------------|
| HEADER | <------- Header.
|---------------|
| Offset to end | <------- This offset is located just past the header.
| of ENTRY.NDS | (unsigned long int)n = Offset/sizeof(ENTRY)
|---------------| gets the number of records.
| ENTRY.NDS |
|---------------|
| Offset to end | <------- (unsigned long int)n = Offset/sizeof(VALUE)
| of VALUE.NDS | gets the number of records.
|---------------|
| VALUE.NDS |
|---------------|
| Offset to end | <------- (unsigned long int)n = Offset/sizeof(BLOCK)
| of BLOCK.NDS | gets the number of records.
|---------------|
| BLOCK.NDS |
|---------------|
| Offset to end | <------- (unsigned long int)n = Offset/sizeof(PARTITIO)
|of PARTITIO.NDS| gets the number of records.
|---------------|
| PARTITIO.NDS |
|---------------|
The BACKUP.DS header section has a rather odd structure consisting of
variable data. While I have taken a look at it, it is not that important when
searching for NDS files. It does contain the server and tree name, and in
multi-server environments you will get a copy of the SAP table, or at least
something with a lot of the same information. This is there, I assume, so
that if and/or when you recover NDS your server will have a fairly clear view
of what the network last looked like.
From this information you should be able to write a program in C that will
take a BACKUP.DS file and make the 4 NDS files. If you do not know how (or do
not have the time) to write such a program, use Pandora Offline to recreate
NDS files from BACKUP.DS.
DSREPAIR.DIB Structure
There are two types of DSREPAIR.DIB structures -- one for Netware 4.x, and
one for Netware 5.x. The one for Netware 4.x is probably more interesting, as
not only can you recover NDS files but you can also retrieve the license and
any login scripts. Here are the layouts for each version of the file:
Netware 4.x
DSREPAIR.DIB
File Structure
|---------------|
| HEADER | <------- 3 unsigned longs header.
|---------------|
| File | <------- 5 unsigned longs, first 4 are the file
| Data | name, fifth one is the length of the file.
|---------------|
| File | <------- The file itself.
|---------------|
| etc. | <------- Repeats File Data and File for most files
|---------------| located in SYS:_NETWARE.
| etc._____/
| _____/
|__/
Netware 5.x
DSREPAIR.DIB
File Structure
|---------------|
| HEADER | <------- 12 unsigned longs header. 8 through 12 are
| | offsets to the NDS files contained.
|---------------|
| File | <------- 2 unsigned longs, first is the file name,
| Data | second one is the length of the file.
|---------------|
| File | <------- The file itself (the first one is 0.DSB).
|---------------|
| etc. | <------- Repeats File Data and File for just the
|---------------| *.DSD files from SYS:_NETWARE.
| etc._____/
| _____/
|__/
DSB Structure
The 0.DSB file has a very simple structure. In fact, here is an entire 0.DSB
file pulled off of a Netware 5 file server:
Offset Data
00000000 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
00000010 02 00 00 00 03 00 00 00
The structure is probably like so:
typedef unsigned long uint32;
typedef struct dsb_file
{
uint32 val1; /* unknown */
uint32 val2; /* unknown */
uint32 entryds; /* "value" of name of ENTRY file */
uint32 valueds; /* "value" of name of VALUE file */
uint32 blockds; /* "value" of name of BLOCK file */
uint32 partitiods; /* "value" of name of PARTITIO file */
} DSB;
While this is really simple, it does open the door for possible extensions of
NDS itself, such as multiple trees on the same server, or subtrees. In other
words, this DSB file would allow for multiple "*.NDS-type" files on a single
server without duplicating the names.
Fun and Games
It is possible, starting with PARTITIO.NDS and its reference to ENTRY.NDS, to
follow each cross reference and get a complete dump of NDS. I have not
written such a utility, nor would I care to. But one of the things that
interested me the first time I looked at BACKUP.DS in a hex viewer was that I
could possibly get user passwords. Novell had originally said that this was
impossible, and that Netware 4.x uses a public key encryption scheme for
authentication. However this did not stop me from exploring and learning
about the size and structure of individual pieces and attributes. The details
of WHAT can be found are much more interesting than how I discovered the
location of the private key. So what follows is the process to get a private
key.
There are two types of users to be found within NDS's structure -- regular
NDS users and bindery users. Each one has a different ENTRY.classID value.
Right now we'll worry about regular NDS users, so we need to grab some
values.
The logical thing is to determine what ENTRY.classID value represents a user
object. This is fairly easy to determine by examining ENTRY records until a
user record is found (CN=Admin makes it easy to find). However this may not
be consistent between servers. Although I found that the classID for 4.x
users is usually 0x010000af, in Netware 5.x this value is different.
Therefore a unified way has to be found that works for both Netware 4.x and
5.x, so the easiest thing is to find a record whose ENTRY.name field is
"User" who has a ENTRY.parentID that is equal to the ENTRY.id for the [Class
Definitions] record. Users are a class of objects in NDS, so we need to find
the record that defines the class called User.
The next thing to do is determine the classID associated with the Private Key
object. This can be done by searching for "Priv". Typically in 4.x this is
0x01000045, although once again in Netware 5.x this is not the case.
Therefore the easiest way to find it is to locate an ENTRY record with a
ENTRY.name field whose first four characters are "Priv" and whose
ENTRY.parentID is equal to the ENTRY.id for the [Attribute Definitions]
record. Private Key is an attribute of a user, so we need to find the record
that defines the Private Key attribute.
So let's kind of tie all of this together. Here are the steps we take:
- The record we want to read in is the third record, which is the [Attribute
Definitions] record. We want its ENTRY.id for finding the record that defines
the Private Key attribute.
- We also read in the fourth record, which is the [Class Definitions]
record. Its ENTRY.id will be used for finding the definition record for the
User class of objects.
- We start our search through the records.
- If we find a record with a value of "User" in the ENTRY.name field and
whose ENTRY.parentID matches the ENTRY.id of the [Class Definitions] record,
then we have found the record that defines the class of users. Its ENTRY.id
is the classID for all user records.
- If we find a record whose first four characters are "Priv" and whose
ENTRY.parentID matches the ENTRY.id of the [Attribute Definitions] record,
then we've located the Private Key attribute definition record. Its ENTRY.id
is the classID for all Private Key attributes.
Now we can search all records looking for those with an ENTRY.classID of
User. This will give us all of the users.
Searching each VALUE record for the ENTRY.id in VALUE.entryID and Private Key
attribute ID in VALUE.typeID will get us the start of the Private Key.
The private key's size=324, so you will have to follow the VALUE.firstBlock
offset in BLOCK.NDS to retrieve all of the data. Here is an example of the
first several bytes of a private key:
User "Simple" (object ID=090000c3) private key:
c3 00 00 09 08 00 00 00 8d 49 e4 55 f2 5a 57 0e bb 8a f9 f6 ea 3a f6 88
01 00 00 00 01 00 60 00 20 01 19 01 38 74 08 89 02 c4 97 a3 43 5d 00 86
etc...
Comparing this private key to other private keys, the structure is roughly as
follows:
typedef struct PRIV_KEY
{
uint32 objectID; /* Object ID of user. */
uint16 pwLength; /* Password length. */
uint16 var1; /* Unsure. Perhaps unused. */
uint8 pw[16]; /* The password, one way hashed. */
uint32 var2; /* No idea, is always 0x00000001 */
uint16 var3; /* No idea, is always 0x0001 */
uint16 var4; /* No idea, is always 0x0006 */
uint32 var5; /* No idea, is always 0x01190120 */
uint8 key[288]; /* The private key, encrypted. */
uint32 var6; /* No idea... */
uint32 var7; /* No idea... */
uint32 var8; /* No idea... */
uint32 var9; /* No idea... */
} PRIV_KEY; /* size=340 */
While it is interesting that on occassion you will see var8 and var9 equal
the first four characters of the user's common name in unicode, the thing
that really looks interesting is the one way encrypted hash. It was
discovered to be the hash because I was specifically looking for a 16 byte
"hash-looking" item in the private keys. Plugging this into the
publically-available hash function confirmed it.
Retrieving this info from ENTRY.NDS, VALUE.NDS, and BLOCK.NDS to specifically
grab info for password cracking could be done by simply looking for the
various IDs at the various offsets and writing them out to a file. To
simplify this process, you can select Extract and Load from the File menu in
Pandora Offline. This will create an NDS-style password file.
And while the names of the files may have changed in Netware 5, the structure
of NDS did not. So this extraction process covers both versions.
Security Implications
If you now have the user's common name, the object ID, the one way hash, and
the algorithm, it should simply be a matter of time to crack the password.
The algorithm used by Novell requires the length of the password, the
password itself, and the object ID to generate the one way hash. Therefore a
dictionary attack could be quite fruitful.
A hard-to-guess password will slow down the process of cracking the password
considerably. However, the algorithm converts the password to upper case
before encryption, and we know the password length before we even start
cracking. While brute force attacks can be lengthy and tiresome, such an
attack is not entirely out of the question.
To demonstrate this, you can use Pandora Offline to perform brute force and
dictionary attacks on the password file you've created. After loading in your
password file, go to the Crack menu and start your cracking.
New since version 2.0 of Pandora are some improvements on this one way hash
algorithm. Jitsu-Disk's work in this area is documented in the accompanying
paper (called CRYPT.TXT), and is based off of looking at crypto.c from the
first version of Pandora.
Other security implications include the fact that there are a number of older
bindery calls intended for Netware 3.x that may be used against Netware 4.x,
and these bindery calls could allow certain security measures to be
circumvented.
While verifying that the same algorithm from Netware 3.x is being used for
Netware 4.x, it was discovered that by performing a verify password call you
could dictionary or brute force attack an account on a Netware 4.x server. By
default, intruder detection is turned off on a freshly loaded Netware 4.x
server. If bindery emulation is being used, a "verify password" call can be
used to check whether a user account exists, and whether a guessed password
is correct.
A number of examples of programs used for logging in can adapted over to
perform this type of attack. It has been reported that KNOCK.EXE has been
used by some hackers to gain access to a Netware 4.x server, and I am aware
of one development company of Netware utilities that had discovered the same
thing.
New since version 2.0 is INTRUDE.EXE and SUPE.EXE. Both are designed to take
advantage of "verify password" routine. INTRUDE.EXE actually does several
things -- it can take a text file containing possible account names on the
Netware 4.x user and test each one individually to see if it is a valid name,
during the valid name check it will also check to see if the valid name has
no password, and it can perform a dictionary attack against a selected
account name. SUPE.EXE also does a dictionary attack against a Netware 4.x
server, but it acts only against a "hidden" object. In version 3.x of Pandora
these utilities are combined into INTRUDER.EXE. In Pandora, you can access
these utilties in the Pandora Online program.
The reason this works is because the very first object created by NDS is a
bindery-style object called Supervisor -- the "hidden" object. This account
has full access to the file system of the server. But because it is not a
regular NDS user object, it does not show up under any of Novell's regular
user utilities. In Netware 4.1 (loaded without newer version of NDS from
Novell's web site) there is no property that allows Intruder Detection to
work on this object, nor is there any of the normal enforcement of password
attributes such as minimum length for a password. Therefore by using normal
3.x bindery-style calls the Supervisor account can be attacked. In Pandora
v4.0, the extraction process pulls out all bindery-style accounts for
cracking, including Supervisor.
Later versions of NDS (available from Novell's website) and the shipping
versions of Netware 4.x and 5.x give this Supervisor object the password
attributes and the ability to perform Intruder Detection. But since Intruder
Detection is off by default, utilities such as SUPE.EXE could succeed. Once
the password has been obtained, this makes for an excellent backdoor into the
server. This object and its use go undetected, although you can only access
that particular server. But since NDS is distributed among servers you can
access any server by logging out and back in to one of the other servers.
One further note, since the calls are "verify password" calls, you can be
logged in as GUEST and then use the INTRUDER attack without having to log out
first.
Summary
Pandora can be used by an intruder (or an adminstrator) in the following
fashion to break in (or to determine vulnerability):
- Use Pandora Online to determine common user accounts.
- Use Pandora Online to determine passwords. This is a dictionary attack, and
any account can be attacked.
- Alternately Pandora Online can be used to determine the password to the
special Supervisor object.
- If Pandora Online and your dictionary list cannot find the password for
Supervisor, try using KNOCK.EXE if Intruder Detection was not triggered.
- By exploiting the information collected from Pandora Online, or any other
utility, try to access SYS:SYSTEM.
- If BACKUP.DS and/or DSREPAIR.DIB exist, they can be copied off of the
server.
- By exploring the NCF files it should be possible to determine the remote
console password, or possibly exploit the read/write access to an NCF file to
gain console access.
- Once console access is gained, using Novell's DSMAINT a fresh BACKUP.DS can
be created and copied down.
- BACKUP.DS can be converted into the original NDS files using Pandora
Offline.
- The NDS files can have Pandora Offline run against them to create the
PASSWORD.NDS file.
- Pandora Offline can be run against PASSWORD.NDS to do either a brute force
attack or a dictionary attack to obtain additional passwords. For the
intruder, this is safer since these attacks can occur offline.
- Odds are that accounts and passwords obtained also exist on other platforms
(such as NT, Unix, MVS, etc.), eliminating the need to "crack" those
platforms.
Simple Nomad - Nomad Mobile Research Centre
thegnome@nmrc.org - http://www.nmrc.org
Version 1 June 27, 1997
Version 2 March 10, 1998
Version 3 May 12, 1999